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The expansion of India’s role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region has aroused 
much interest in recent years.  Many inside and outside India see great potential for India, 
and particularly the Indian Navy, to play a positive role in enhancing the region’s security in 
the context of India’s rise as a major power.  Over the last several decades, India has 
developed good security relationships in the Indian Ocean, particularly with island or small 
littoral states such as Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar in the southwest Indian Ocean, 
Oman and Qatar in the Persian Gulf, the Maldives in the central Indian Ocean and Singapore 
in the east.   India is now seen as a key security provider to, and even a security guarantor 
of, several of these states.  However, the history of India’s strategic role in the Indian Ocean 
has not been the subject of a great deal of study.  This article will examine India’s previously 
undisclosed interventions in the Seychelles in 1986, which acted as a prelude to other 
interventions throughout the region, including India’s foray in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the 
Maldives in 1988. 
 
1. Seychelles as a Cold War battleground  
 
During the 1980s the Seychelles and other Indian Ocean states found themselves embroiled 
in a Cold War battleground.  The location of the tiny Seychelles in the western Indian Ocean 
between Madagascar and the Persian Gulf made it especially prime for US-Soviet rivalry.  
The United States had maintained a small satellite tracking station there since colonial 
times.  The US also wished to establish a base in the Seychelles to avoid over-reliance on its 
base at Diego Garcia, something the Seychelles resisted.   At the same time the Soviets 
wanted the US evicted from the Seychelles and to establish its own a base there to match 
Diego Garcia. 
 
Seychelles was led by a socialist dictator, President Albert René, who had gained power in a 
1977 coup shortly after Seychelles’ independence, overthrowing the former President James 
Mancham.  Although he had a fondness for Marxist rhetoric, in practice René tried to 
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maintain a broadly non-aligned stance similar to India’s.  This included balancing the 
competing interests of the United States and Soviet Union while maintaining a publicly 
hostile stance to the white South African regime.  René’s one-party state also became a 
magnet for international organised crime and the target for numerous coup plots.   
 
In 1981, the South African security services (through a private company called Longreach) 
famously organised an attempted coup against René by a group of 44 white mercenaries led 
by Colonel “Mad” Mike Hoare.1  The mercenaries took a commercial flight to Victoria, the 
Seychelles capital, in the guise of a beer drinking fraternity.  However, the plot was 
uncovered at Victoria airport when the mercenaries’ bags were discovered to be full of 
weapons.  A gunfight ensued, which ended when most of the mercenaries flew to 
Johannesburg aboard a hijacked Air India 707.  The 1981 Hoare plot caused a major 
international scandal as the full role of the South African security services was revealed.    
The South African government was forced to pay a ransom for mercenaries that had been 
left behind in the Seychelles and placed those that had returned to Johannesburg on trial.  
However, in the aftermath of the 1981 coup attempt, Seychelles relationship with South 
Africa improved considerably.  The South African government undertook not to threaten 
Seychelles security and instead developed close security links with many in the René 
regime.2  Seychelles also improved its working relationship with the United States, although 
René continued, to some degree, his Marxist rhetoric.  The Soviet Union continued to 
provide substantial military aid to the regime, including some 20 military advisors to the 
armed forces.   
 
Despite its secret rapprochement with South Africa, in the following years multiple coups 
against René were planned by elements in René’s regime, among Seychellois exiles in 
Britain, South Africa and Australia and by assorted anti-communists in Pretoria and 
Washington.    Beset by plots, President René turned to India as a security provider, seeking 
1 For an entertaining account of the attempted coup, see Mike Hoare, The Seychelles Affair (New 
York: Bantam, 1986). 
2 See Stephen Ellis, “Africa and International Corruption: The Strange Case of South Africa and 
Seychelles,” African Affairs (1996), 95, pp.165-196 
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a commitment from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to intervene against any coups.  
René commented that India was “the awkward grandfather of the region.  India would like 
to play a big role, but it has a complex, that people will say they’re being imperialistic 
….India should say ‘we’re not going to let that nonsense go on.’”3  India responded 
cautiously. When Indira Gandhi was asked to give a public commitment to intervene in a 
coup against René she declined, commenting, “we don’t think it would be wise.”4   
 
Nevertheless in the following years, India provided two helicopters, training and technicians 
to the tiny Seychelles air force.   The Indian navy also regularly sent an Indian naval vessel to 
attend Seychelles’ Independence Day celebrations.  In 1984, Captain Ranjit B. Rai, one of the 
authors of this article, attended the celebrations in command of INS Vindhaygiri, 
accompanied by INS Rajput under the command of Captain PS Das and the Fleet 
Commander Rear Admiral IJS Khurana.  The Seychelles Minister of Defence, Ogilvy Berlouis, 
was invited on board and later, together with his charming wife, entertained Indian officers 
at his home after the traditional Independence Day parade.  Visiting ship’s officers 
customarily familiarised themselves with the Seychelles geography and its leadership, later 
providing intelligence reports and a letter of proceedings on the visit, standard procedures 
inherited from the Royal Navy.   
 
2. India asserts a role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region 
 
From the early 1980s, India had begun asserting a broad security role in the Indian Ocean 
region.  In 1981, the Indian Navy made advanced preparations to intervene to support 
Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam against a feared coup by the Muslim-based Mauritian 
Militant Movement.  The Indian Navy began loading equipment in Mumbai for an army 
expeditionary force to Mauritius, although the operation did not proceed due to political 
caution and logistical problems – among other things there were concerns that the Indian 
3 Selig S. Harrison, K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean : Indian and American 
perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.263. 
4 Ibid.  Only days earlier, in August 1982, René’s Tanzanian bodyguard had quelled an army mutiny, 
while the Soviets had brought two destroyers into Victoria Harbour as a show of support. 
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Navy did not then have sufficient operational resources to project power at that distance.   
In 1984, on the orders of Indira Gandhi, the Indian Army and Navy also began contingency 
planning for an intervention in Sri Lanka in support of an independent Tamil state.  This was 
apparently leaked to the Sri Lankan government, leading it to scale down military operations 
against the Tamil insurgents. 
 
The assassination of Indira Gandhi and appointment of Rajiv Gandhi as Indian Prime 
Minister in 1984 was followed by an almost unprecedented level of security activity by 
India.  In South Asia, the Indian armed forces undertook a massive game of brinksmanship 
with Pakistan (Exercise Brasstacks  -1986) under the swashbuckling Army Chief, General 
K.Sundarji, which nearly brought India and Pakistan to war.  In March 1987, the army began 
challenging China through a complicated series of deployments in the Himalayas (Exercise 
Checkerboard).  In July 1987, Rajiv Gandhi made a hurried and ill-fated commitment of 
peacekeeping forces in the Sri Lankan civil war (Operation Pawan).  The intervention was 
intended to enforce a negotiated solution to civil war and guarantee political autonomy for 
Sri Lankan Tamils.  However, Indian forces, which ultimately numbered some 80,000 troops 
plus elements of the Indian Navy and Air Force, soon found themselves in a full sale conflict 
with Tamil insurgents and began to suffer heavy losses.5     
 
India was also stretching its strategic and diplomatic legs elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, 
marking a major break from India’s long opposition to military interventions outside of 
South Asia.  From the mid 1980s, the India Navy’s growing capabilities gave it new options.  
As Admiral RH Tahiliani, the former Chief of Naval Staff, commented at the time:  “We must 
take the responsibility that size imposes on us, without having any hegemonistic aspirations.  
Coming to the help of a small neighbour is a responsibility, but we have no intention of 
5 For a description of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, see Alan J. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the 
Tamil crisis, 1976-1994 : an international perspective  (London: Pinter, 1995.  Although the Indian 
Navy actively participated in Operation Pawan against the Tamil insurgents, transporting men and 
materials for the Indian Army, no ship was damaged and the navy suffered no casualties.  
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spreading our sphere of influence.”6  As will be discussed below, in 1986, the Indian Navy 
secretly intervened in the Seychelles to head off an attempted coup.  In early 1987, the 
Indian Navy began patrolling the Mozambique Channel to interdict the supply by sea of 
South African-backed RENAMO insurgents fighting the Mozambique government.7  In 
November 1988, following a request by the Maldivian President, India flew a battalion of 
paratroops to the Maldives, making a daring landing at Malé airport to avert an attempted 
coup by Tamil mercenaries (Operation Cactus).  The Indian forces quickly defeated the 
rebels and were able to secure the Maldives capital without any Indian casualties.  Two 
Indian frigates, the INS Godavari and INS Betwa, later captured fleeing mercenaries at sea.8  
The Indian government consulted both the United States and Britain prior to its intervention 
in the 1988 Maldives coup, with Margaret Thatcher reportedly commenting:  “Thank God 
for India: President Gayoom’s government has been saved.  We could not have assembled 
and dispatched a force from here in good time to help him.”9  Most of the Indian troops 
were quickly withdrawn after order had been restored, with around 150 troops remaining 
for a year after the attempted coup.     
 
India’s unprecedented level of activity in the Indian Ocean region only lasted for several 
years and ended after Indian troops were withdrawn from Sri Lanka in early 1990 after 
failing to quell the Tamil insurgency.  India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, involving Indian losses 
of approximately 1400 dead, become known as “India’s Vietnam.”  Rajiv Gandhi was 
6 Quoted in Raju G.C.Thomas, “The Sources of Indian Naval Expansion,” in Robert H.Bruce, The 
Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean: Developments and Implications (Perth: Centre for Indian 
Ocean Regional Studies, 1989), pp.95-108. 
7 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 14 March 1987, p.3. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had earlier 
deflected suggestions that Indian troops be deployed to protect Indian workers on the Beira railway 
line.    
8 For an account of Operation Cactus, see Ramesh Trivedi, India’s relations with her neighbours 
(Delhi: Isha Books, 2008). 
9 Quoted in Gordon, Sandy with Desmond Ball, Paul Dibb and Amin Saikal, 1996, Security and 
Security Building in the Indian Ocean (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), pp.55-6. 
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subsequently assassinated by Tamil extremists in May 1991 in retribution for his role in the 
operation.   India found that foreign interventions can sometimes carry a big cost.    
 
 3. India’s intervention in the Seychelles 
 
India had taken an active security role in the Indian Ocean since the mid 1980s.   In 1986, 
India’s security role in Seychelles crystallised over a series of coup attempts against 
President René led by the Seychelles Minister of Defence, Ogilvy Berlouis.  Many of the 
details of these coup attempts remain unclear, perhaps because more than one coup was 
apparently being organised at the time.10  According to some reports, the Berlouis plot, 
codenamed Operation Distant Lash, involved some 30 mercenaries and 350 Seychellois 
(although Indian sources believe this was an overestimate).  Some claim that it had the 
support of South African intelligence and of prominent anti-communists in Washington.11  
Berlouis had been invited to the Pentagon in 1985 and, according to one report some in the 
US security establishment saw Berlouis as a potential future president of the islands, 
recognising in him an ambitious man with no ideological baggage despite his tenure of a 
senior post of the René government.12  However, it seems that there was some ambivalence 
in the Reagan administration about any moves against René, fearing that Seychelles could 
be destabilised by the installation of a new leader.13 Since the 1981 attempted coup, René 
10 For example, at about the same time in 1986, Peter Drummond, a Sydney organized crime figure 
was recruited by an associate of the former President Mancham to organise a six or seven man 
assault team to take control of a prison in the Seychelles, free the political prisoners and then take 
control of key areas on the main island.  The coup was planned to take place in October 1986, but in 
the meantime Drummond was arrested by Australian police on murder charges.  See “Plan for 
Islands Coup,” Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 1986. 
11 David Hebditch and Ken Connor, How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution 
(London: Greenhill, 2005), p.155. 
12 Stephen Ellis, “Africa and International Corruption: The Strange Case of South Africa and 
Seychelles,” African Affairs (1996), 95, pp.165-196 at p.189.   Berlouis was also embroiled in 
kickbacks. 
13 Ibid., p.190. 
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had mended fences with South Africa and the United States: he was increasingly viewed as 
someone who they could work with and in late 1985 had agreed to extend the US lease on 
the satellite tracking station.   
 
Nevertheless, in early June 1986, Berlouis and his co-conspirators decided to move against 
René.  When New Delhi was informed of an impending coup by either Indian or Soviet 
sources, Prime Minister Gandhi (who was also Minister of Defence) and the junior Defence 
Minister, Arun Singh, personally contacted the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral RH Tahiliani, 
with a verbal request to provide assistance to René.    Coincidentally, the Indian Navy had 
already dispatched the INS Vindhyagiri under Captain S. Ramsagar on a scheduled visit to 
Seychelles to participate in Seychelles Independence Day celebrations.  It was decided that 
on arrival Vindhyagiri would report an engineering defect requiring an extended stay in Port 
Victoria.  The Director of Naval Intelligence and Director of Naval Operations then briefed a 
Commodore who was sent to the Seychelles on a commercial airline to command the 
operation and ostensibly take charge of repairing the ship.  A local engineering company 
was also enlisted to make some minor repairs.  An Indian Navy “engineering” team of 20 
sailors trained in weapons was readied for dispatch to Port Victoria, although their presence 
was not ultimately required.  The Indian Navy gave the operation the codename Flowers Are 
Blooming.   
 
In the meantime, René repaired to the Presidential Palace under the protection of his 50-
strong North Korean bodyguard while the INS Vindhyagiri remained at Port Victoria for 12 
days, making great use of its Sea King to provide public displays of helicopter commando 
“slithering” and assaults. The ship regularly trained its 4.5 inch gun on power mode as a 
demonstration to the coup plotters.  Also present in Port Victoria was a Soviet Turya class 
patrol boat, the Zoroaster, which was due to be handed over to the Seychelles.14  The 
Zoroaster’s captain was junior in rank to the Vindhyagiri’s captain.  At one stage the 
Zoroaster left Port Victoria on patrol in response to a report that two Royal Naval vessels 
14 Although the Zoroaster was formally handed over in late June 1986, the Soviet crew remained in 
the Seychelles until 1987. 
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intended to enter the port in support of the planned coup.15  By mid June the planned coup 
had been averted.  Seychellois authorities – with the likely assistance of Indian security 
services - arrested six men (but not Berlouis).  Indian sources believe that the presence of an 
Indian naval vessel made a significant contribution to averting a coup.   As a former Indian 
intelligence officer who was in the Seychelles during the period commented, the Indian 
naval presence “served the purpose.” 
 
Two months later Berlouis made another attempt to unseat President René which India 
again helped to quash.  The plot was uncovered in late August while President René was 
attending a meeting of the Non Aligned Movement in Harare with Rajiv Gandhi and other 
leaders of non-aligned states.   René may have been told of the planned coup by the South 
African security services whose strategy was cultivating all sides in Seychelles with a view to 
cementing its own influence.  According to another report, René was personally informed 
about the plot by Rajiv Gandhi who had been tipped off by the Soviets.16 Gandhi lent René 
his own plane, Air India 001, to return to Seychelles early.   According to one report on 6 
September René, disguised as an Indian woman wearing a sari, was met at the airport by 
the Indian High Commissioner and taken to the Commissioner’s residence.17 Berlouis and 
other plotters were then tracked to the island of Praslin.  Berlouis and four other army 
officers were forced to resign and Berlouis left for London.   The Indian ship INS Godavari, 
which was then returning to India from New York after taking part in centenary celebrations 
for the Statue of Liberty, was diverted to Port Victoria, although it only arrived on 24 
September and departed several days after.  It was reported that in October 1986, some 50 
15 These may have been the HMS Exeter and HMS Charybdis, which were on tour in the Indian Ocean 
at the time.  The authors are not aware of any evidence that the British government had any 
connection with the planned coup. 
16  “Seychelles: The Game of Nations” Africa Confidential, Vol.28, No.22, 4 November 1987. 
17 Donald Taylor, Launching out into the deep:  the Anglican Church in the history of the Seychelles to 
2000 AD (Victoria: Board of Church Commissioners, 2005), p.648 and additional information 
provided by the author. 
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Soviet troops were landed by the Soviet amphibious vessel the Ivan Rogov, to provide 
additional security to René.18 
 
India’s interventions cemented India’s role in the Seychelles.  In 1989, India established the 
Seychelles Defence Academy and continues to play an important role in Seychelles’ security.   
Although India lost some of its assertiveness in the region in the wake of the Sri Lankan 
debacle, since the turn of the century it has been actively re-establishing its security role in 
the Indian Ocean.  Today, India has close security relationships with many states in the 
southwest Indian Ocean, including Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Mozambique, 
which form an important part of India’s broader strategy in the Indian Ocean.19   
 
Conclusion 
 
Operation Flowers Are Blooming was the first demonstration of the Indian Navy’s capability 
to influence political events throughout the Indian Ocean, far from the navy’s traditional 
area of operations in South Asia.   It showed that the navy could be used to project power 
effectively, at long distance, and with relative discretion.  Naval diplomacy by the Indian 
Navy has been used to great effect in recent years.  The success of the Seychelles operation 
may also have given the Rajiv Gandhi government confidence that it could execute low cost 
military interventions in its Indian Ocean neighbours, including its decision to intervene in 
Sri Lanka in July 1987 and it successful intervention in the Maldives in November 1988.  That 
the Sri Lanka intervention was ultimately disastrous for the Indian Army, Rajiv Gandhi, and 
of course Sri Lanka, is a reminder of the risks involved in such actions.    
  
* David Brewster is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University. 
**Commodore Ranjit Rai (retd.) is a former Director of Naval Intelligence of the Indian Navy. 
18 “Soviet base reported in Seychelles,” The Spokesman-Review, 9 November 1987. 
19 See generally, David Brewster, “An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?” Security 
Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-20. 
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